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I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been evolving as a security actor with significant 
transformations since the Lisbon Treaty 2009. In defence matters, we are witnessing a 
“brave new world” for the Union in the sense that there has been noticeable acceleration 
in the last two years and results are expected from 2018 onwards. 
We argue that the promotion of  the “Security Union” commissioner under 
Juncker’s leadership promotes an agenda for security that operationalizes security 
nexuses that define the Union’s external action. Additionally, the broadening of  the 
security agenda in terms of  internal and external threats blurs the lines between 
institutions dealing with justice and home affairs and external affairs. This raises the 
issue of  consistency of  the Union’s policies.
This article aims to give, firstly, an overview of  the Union’s understanding 
of  security by presenting security nexuses at play and securitization processes. 
Secondly, the analysis unpacks how the “Security Union” developments reflect this 
understanding and further presents key developments in the defence realm that 
tackle the digital/cybernetic dimension of  threats.
II. Balancing values and interests: the meaning of  “security” 
for the EU
The EU, as a security actor, has been prominently analysed under two prisms: 
the security nexuses and the processes of  securitisation. These two conceptual 
frameworks are informative of  the Union’s vision about what security means and 
what is constitutive of  threats. This section unpacks the main contributions of  the 
two approaches in understanding the rationales that drive the “Security Union” 
agenda and EU’s external action at large.
The EU’s political values shape an approach, through which the EU promotes 
transformation in third countries, namely in its enlargement policy and neighbourhood 
policy. EU values include respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of  law. In the context of  enlargement and relations 
with neighbouring countries, including Russia, the values and principles are defined 
as follows: the rule of  law; good governance; respect for human rights, including 
the rights of  minorities; promoting good neighbourly relations; principles of  market 
economy and sustainable development.1 
However, the Union also has strategic interests as protracted by Member States 
and institutions, that also shape its external policies. The postulate is that Brussels 
prioritizes a normative approach when it emphasizes the rule of  law, democracy, and 
human rights. When framing its decisions in terms of  security, it adopts a strategic 
approach. This dichotomy represents the values-security nexus and produces tensions 
among EU actors in the promotion of  external policies.
The second security nexus is known as “internal-external” and results from 
processes of  securitization. The relationship between “inside” and “outside” has 
long been regarded as central in the EU’s security policy.2 Securitization is a discursive 
1 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on relations with Russia”, Brussels, 9 February, COM(2004) 106.
2 Didier Bigo, “Internal and External Security(ies): The Möbius Ribbon”, in Identities, Borders, Orders: 
Rethinking International Relations Theory, ed. M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid. (Minneapolis, 
University of  Minnesota Press, 2006), 91-116; Didier Bigo, “When Two become One: Internal and 
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process through which a securitising agent is successful in portraying an issue as 
an existential threat to a referent object and in demanding exceptional measures to 
tackle that threat. “Securitisation theory is premised on a constructivist notion of  security, in the 
sense that ‘security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitising them’”.3
Bigo4 has developed the analysis on the internal-external nexus, namely 
concerning the issue of  migration. This literature is part of  a global approach of  
the EU security “actorness”5 that is accompanied, in parallel, by the Union’s own 
narrative on the nexus: internal-external, security-development, civilian-military, 
public-private.6 The thinking about the security nexus is, thus, also driven by the 
“securitization” concept that highlights the role of  the externalisation of  internal 
security for the legitimation of  the EU’s role.7
Additionally, the merging of  internal and external security has prompted the 
creation of  an external dimension of  the EU area of  Justice and Home Affairs that 
seeks to promote the rule of  law in neighbouring countries. Each specific policy field 
needs to be analysed in order to understand how the EU displays simultaneously 
normative and strategic intents, as opposed to assuming a strict dichotomy to define 
its actions.8
The literature concerning the EU as a normative/security power is, thus, related 
to the thinking about the internal-external security nexus. As Traunert underlines, 
the comprehensive coherence of  EU foreign policy is at stake depending on the 
balance between values and priorities. “One of  the major challenges for the EU has been to 
ensure that the mainstreaming of  internal security objectives in the EU’s external relations does 
not undermine the normative aspirations of  EU foreign policy-making”.9 He underlines the 
relegation of  values in favour of  security concerns, specifically in the area of  Justice 
and Home Affairs.
III. “Security Union” and the digital/cybernetic dimension 
of  security
We argue here that the “Security Union” policy area is framed under the two 
above-mentioned nexuses and processes of  securitization. This understanding 
originates the agenda for security of  the EU and the means that it ought to develop. 
One of  the main objectives of  the European Commission is to “address the existing 
shortcomings of  EU information systems for security and border management.” Additionally, it 
incorporated the aim “to counter radicalisation and the cyber threat.”10 
External Securitisations in Europe”, in International Relations Theory and the Politics of  European Integration, 
Power, Security and Community, ed. M. Kelstrup and M. C. Williams. (London: Routledge, 2001), 320-360.
3 Barry Buzan, et al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998): 204.
4 Didier Bigo, Internal and External…
5 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 
2006).
6 Ana Paula Brandão, “The Internal-External nexus in the security narrative of  the European Union”, 
JANUS.NET e-journal of  International Relations 6(1) (2015).
7 Didier Bigo, Internal and External…; Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
8 Nicole Wichmann, “Promoting the rule of  law in the European neighbourhood policy: Strategic or 
normative power?”, Politique européenne 22(2) (2007): 81-104.
9 Florian Traunert, “The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?”, EUISS 
Occasional Paper, 89 (2011): 21.
10 European Commission, “Commission delivers on interoperability and measures to fight terrorism 
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The idea that security under the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio has to be 
integrated in a comprehensive approach is, thus, materialized in the “Security Union” 
that merges internal and external threats. As far as the emergence of  the digital 
dimension is concerned, a process of  securitization has brought home the idea that 
we are more vulnerable because there is no security setting for how we relate to the 
world.11
The EU’s view is about creating a European agenda for security where 
information systems need to be defended and resilient. This agenda is fast evolving 
and widening. For instance, in the prism of  “external border”, the dimension of  
combating hybrid threats was introduced in April 2016 with a “Joint Framework”.12 
The Union is progressing towards a definition of  these threats that comprises “non-
conventional forms, such as radicalisation leading to terrorist attacks, chemical attacks, cyber-attacks 
or disinformation campaigns.” They “combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-
military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve 
specific political objectives” that resume to endanger European societies and EU values.13
Beyond emerging agendas and technical issues, such as the creation of  
interoperability of  EU information systems for borders and security14, there is a 
geopolitical context that explains why the Union is producing this specific set of  
policies to address external threats. The geopolitical situation in its immediate 
vicinity has turned the fight against terrorism into a priority and the migration 
pressure a security issue, resulting from a process of  securitisation. Additionally, the 
degradation of  relations with Russia in the aftermath of  the annexation of  Crimea in 
March 2014 has highlighted the digital/cybernetic threats in the context of  methods 
of  hybrid warfare.15
The creation of  the East Stratcom Task Force, in 2015, at the European 
External Action Service exemplifies the above-mentioned understanding. The Task 
Force received funding from the EU budget for the first time, for the 2018-2020 
period.16 The body aims to raise awareness and understanding of  disinformation and 
improve the Union’s own performance concerning its news and communication and 
support to journalism in Eastern Europe.
Taking into account the nexus between internal and external threats and the 
balance between security and the normative concerns, above-mentioned, EU policies 
and the cyber threat” (2017).
11 James Morrison, Address at the Annual Policy Security Summit “Europe’s tough neighbourhood: 
urgent challenges in a complex environment”, Friends of  Europe, Brussels, 28 November (2017).
12 European Commission, “An European Agenda on Security. State of  Play”, June (2017). 
13 European Union External Action Service, “A Europe that Protects: Countering Hybrid Threats”, 13 
June (2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46393/europe-protects-
countering-hybrid-threats_en. 
14 European Parliament, “Interoperability between EU information systems (police and judicial 
cooperation, asylum and migration)”, Procedure File 2017/0352(COD), 2018.
15 LeBrun defines hybrid warfare as follow: “the concept is currently used to describe and denounce Russian 
actions in Ukraine and influence operations in the informational sphere as well as cybernetic and covert actions. (...) 
Remnant Soviet-style tactics of  manipulation, deception, and disinformation are crucial in achieving military success 
without engaging military forces, as it would favor the internal decay of  target societies and sow defeatism and induce 
compliance. (...) Whatever the preferred terminology, Russia builds and thinks its coercion instruments along to full-
spectrum posture. Technological and informational capacities are enablers of  all other dimensions of  conflict”. See 
Maxime LeBrun, “Sitting on the Fence: The ‘Hybrid’ Moment”, ICDS, 11 October, (2017).
16 Jennifer Ranking, “EU anti-propaganda unit gets €1m a year to counter Russian fake news”, The 
Guardian, November 25, 2017.
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to address security needs can be found in several dimensions of  the European 
process of  integration. The broader framework of  the “comprehensive approach” 
sustains this understanding. This approach was formulated in 2016 and is further 
complemented by the EU Global Strategy of  the same year.17 The bottom line is the 
will to use the Union’s tools in a more coherent way, including an inter-institutional 
perspective.
In this broader context, an emphasis on defence is taking place with, for instance, 
advancements in the military sphere such as Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) and a tightening of  EU-NATO cooperation. PESCO results from the 
provisions of  the Lisbon Treaty and was adopted by 25 Member States in December 
2017. Among the 17 projects that are being developed, several include the cyber 
domain.18
The cooperation with NATO highlights the cyber dimension as well and EU-
NATO joint work is instrumental in the EU’s view. Since December 2016, initiatives 
include the participation of  the Union in NATO’s cyber exercises, the exchange of  
military concepts, interoperability and staff-to-staff  contacts.19
In the words of  the Head of  Cabinet to European Commissioner for Security 
Union, both the end of  the peace dividend and of  the financial crisis explain today 
developments such as PESCO, as compared to the post-Treaty of  Lisbon period.20 
Additionally, the cyber threat is so massive that it demands collective action and 
responsibility. The costs of  developing tools in the cyber domain are high and 
PESCO can be a facilitator because it demonstrates the linkage of  digital to the field 
of  defence that is increasingly complex, comprehensive, and integrated.
IV. Conclusion
The EU is confronted with many security challenges that require multiple 
forms of  defence and resilience. The steps towards digital interoperability in several 
domains such as Justice and Home Affairs or tackling cyber threats are part of  
processes of  securitization that comprise two elements. On the one hand, the Union 
is increasingly viewing threats as being internal and external in nature. Consequently, 
on the other hand, the policies and instruments to address these threats have to 
engage all the portfolios of  EU actors.
The first accelerator of  the incorporation of  the digital dimension in the EU’s security 
policies is, thus, the European Commission’s new ambition to bring security and 
defence to the core of  the EU. The second factor is the new external environment 
that includes challenges such as migration, Russia, the distancing by the United States, 
a traditional ally with growing isolationist proclivities, and Brexit.
17 High Representative of  the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint 
communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU’s comprehensive approach to 
external conflict and crises. Brussels, 11.12.2013 JOIN(2013) 30 final (2016).
18 Council of  the European Union, “Defence cooperation: Council adopts an implementation roadmap 
for the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)”, (2018), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2018/03/06/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-an-implementation-
roadmap-for-the-permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco/.
19 NATO, “Statement on the implementation of  the Joint Declaration signed by the President of  
the European Council, the President of  the European Commission, and the Secretary General of  
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, (2016) https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_
texts_138829.htm.
20 James Morrison, Address…
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As underlined by Morrison21, the cyber domain is a team sport more than any other 
domain. The growing cooperation with NATO in this field since 2016 is one of  
the signals of  this understanding. However, investment in defence is based on risks 
and the notion of  risk in the cyber area is not yet direct for all Member States with 
significant differences among them. The Baltic States, and particularly Estonia, have 
been very active in promoting the digital and cyber dimensions of  EU (and NATO) 
security.22 The way forward for the Union in this domain is, arguably, a process of  
securitization that will shape new policies and tools, beyond the ongoing agenda on 
interoperability.
21 James Morrison, Address…
22 Sandra Fernandes and Daniel Correia, “(Re)Securitization in Europe: the Baltic States and Russia”, 
Debater Europa 18 (2018): 103-129.
